Abstracts are the authors' own, retrieved by digital object identifier and not
edited. Where a publisher deposits none, the space is left empty rather than filled with a
paraphrase. Anything marked as our note is this project's summary and not the authors'. The
closeness mark is our judgment of how near a study sits to what this project does, where five
would mean the analysis has already been run.
How this project stands to what is already published
Ron asked for this check before any of the analysis was shown to anyone, on the principle
that the question should not be presented as untouched if others have reached it. Most of the
design has been reached. Three studies sit closest.
| study | data | what it measures | what it finds |
|---|
| Böhringer and Boucher 2024 Electoral Studies | European Values Study 2017, one wave, about 34 countries | Confidence in the judiciary among people whose party governs against those whose does not, with government and parliament as comparisons | A gap exists for the judiciary, smaller than for government and parliament, and wider among supporters of populist parties |
| Hadászi 2025 Acta Politologica | European Social Survey linked to V-Dem, four countries | The government-opposition gap in political trust, country by year | Country averages of trust do not track democratic quality; the gap does, and precedes decline rather than following it, with a threshold past which erosion is rapid |
| Bauer and Morisi 2023 Socius | European Social Survey 2002 to 2020, 25 states | The spread of a trust distribution rather than its average, using variance | Trust in the European and national parliaments has polarized; the paper carries no court item |
What we replicate
Böhringer and Boucher's central result appears in our data independently, on a different
survey and across eleven rounds rather than one. Mean gap between people on the right and
people on the left, averaged over every European country-round we hold:
| institution | gap, 0 to 10 |
|---|
| the government | 1.60 |
| parliament | 0.81 |
| the legal system | 0.67 |
Courts divide a public, and they divide it less than the elected institutions do. That
finding is not new and this project should not present it as new.
What we add
Direction. This is the piece none of the three has and the one that speaks to
Hadászi most directly. A cross-lagged panel on 812 country-years in
38 countries, pooling three surveys against V-Dem, finds that attacks on the
judiciary, polarization and falling judicial independence each forecast a wider court gap a year
later, at +0.123 (t +2.3), +0.364 (t +2.8) and -0.206 (t -2.7), while the gap forecasts none of them, with
coefficients between +0.002 and +0.015. An event study on 29 episodes where attacks jumped
sharply shows the gap flat before and through the attack and +0.80 standard deviations
wider three years after.
Level against division. No published study separates a public losing faith in its
courts from a public dividing about them, and reported as an average the two are identical.
Across 765 country-institution series in 84 countries, courts lose faith less
often than other institutions and sort about as often, and six European countries gained trust
while their gaps widened by 10 to 27 points. Germany went from 58.5 to 68.7 on the level and 3.8
to 24.3 on the gap over the same twenty-nine years. That is a different diagnosis from the one
the literature reports, and the remedies differ.
Trust against judicial power. Every study above measures trust. Asking the same people
whether courts should be able to stop a government, in eighteen national election studies, gives
a second quantity that behaves differently: the trust gap flips sign with who holds the courts
and correlates +0.68 with the trust-in-government gap, while the judicial-power gap does not, and
the two correlate −0.18 with each other. As polarization rises the right trusts the courts more
relative to the left and wants them less able to stop a government.
Time. Böhringer and Boucher have a single wave. One wave cannot say which institution
divided first, whether courts are last, or when a country turned. Our sequencing rests on 24
Latin American waves, 11 European rounds and 35 Eurobarometer waves.
A comparison outside politics. Their comparison institutions are government and
parliament, both political, so they can show courts divide less than those two but not whether
courts behave like a political institution at all. Our placebos are schools, hospitals, the
police, the church and the army. That is what allows the claim that courts sit inside the
political cluster at its weak end, rather than merely below parliament.
The dispersion outcome. No published study takes the spread of a court-trust
distribution as the thing to be explained. Bauer and Morisi run exactly that operation, on the
same survey and across 25 of the same countries, and their paper has no court item in it.
A threshold from the other direction. Hadászi finds a threshold in four countries, on
the outcome side: past a certain trust gap, democratic quality erodes quickly. We find one in
{len(t)} countries on the predictor side. No country at or below the median on average
polarization saw its public divide about its courts, none of {len(low)}, while
{int(high.turned.sum())} of {len(high)} above it did. Two thresholds found from opposite ends
of the same relationship is corroboration rather than repetition.
Where the arrows point differently, and what we can now say about it
Hadászi treats the division of trust as what precedes democratic decline. This project
treated polarization as what may precede the division of trust about courts. When this page was
first written neither of us had evidence on the ordering, and it said so.
We do now, and it complicates both. The left-right GAP about courts forecasts nothing about
what a government will do next: not attacks on the judiciary, not a fall in judicial
independence, not a rise in polarization. What does forecast attacks is the LEVEL of public
trust in courts, at -0.149 with a t of -3.6, and courts are the
clearest case among the eight institutions in the battery. So a public losing confidence in its
courts precedes a government moving against them, and a public dividing about them does not.
That is close to Hadászi's claim in its direction and different in its quantity. It also says
the warning most of this literature reports, a widening gap, is not the early signal it looks
like. Both results can still be true and neither study tests the whole chain.
A cross-lagged coefficient is a prediction, not an effect, and the event study
has no control group. What they rule out is one of the two orderings, which is more than this
project could say this morning.
Dispersion as the outcome
Studies that take the spread of an attitude distribution as the thing to be explained, rather than its average. This is the strand the project sits closest to, and the one where no study yet uses a court item.
5 studies
Bauer, Paul C.; Morisi, Davide · 2023 · Socius 9: 23780231231175430
abstract Scholars usually investigate how average levels of trust in institutions vary across countries and over time. Focusing on average levels, however, ignores distributional properties that might be equally relevant for institutional legitimacy and, more broadly, democratic stability. In this study, the authors investigate how the distribution of trust in the European Parliament has changed over time and across European Union member states. Drawing on pooled cross-sectional data from the European Social Survey for the period from 2002 to 2020, the authors find that confidence in the European Parliament has not only declined over time but also polarized as citizens have increasingly moved away from the “average citizen.” Furthermore, the authors find that trust has polarized, especially among the young versus the elderly and the employed versus the unemployed. These findings have implications for the legitimacy of European Union institutions.
our note Trust in the European Parliament declined and its variance rose; between-group polarization strongest for young vs elderly and employed vs unemployed. Courts and the legal system are not analysed
- data
- ESS rounds 1-10, 2002-2020, 25 EU member states
- outcome
- Distribution of trust in the European Parliament; trust in national parliament as a check
- polarization measured as
- Variance of the 0-10 trust scale, plus between-group gaps by education, income, work status, age and left-right
- countries
- 25 EU member states
closeness to this project, 4 of 5
Teney, Celine; Pietrantuono, Giuseppe; Wolfram, Tobias · 2024 · PLOS ONE 19(5): e0302446
abstract Various studies point to the lack of evidence of distributive opinion polarization in Europe. As most studies analyse the same item batteries from international social surveys, this lack of polarization might be due to an item’s issue (e.g., the nature or substance of an item) or item formulation characteristics used to measure polarization. Based on a unique sample of 817 political attitudinal items asked in 2022 by respondents of a non-random online panel in Germany, we empirically assess the item characteristics most likely to lead to distributive opinion polarization–measured with the Van der Eijk agreement index. Our results show that only 20% of the items in our sample have some–at most moderate–level of opinion polarization. Moreover, an item’s salience in the news media before the survey data collection, whether an item measures attitudes toward individual financial and non-financial costs, and the implicit level of knowledge required to answer an item (level of technicality) are significantly associated with higher opinion polarization. By contrast, items measuring a cultural issue (such as issues on gender, LGTBQI+, and ethnic minorities) and items with a high level of abstraction are significantly associated with a lower level of polarization. Our study highlights the importance of reflecting on the potential influence of an item’s issue and item formulation characteristics on the empirical assessment of distributive opinion polarization.
our note About 20 per cent of items show any polarization, and at most moderate; media salience and cost attitudes predict which ones
- data
- 817 attitudinal items, German online panel 2022
- outcome
- Distributive polarization of each item
- polarization measured as
- van der Eijk agreement index as the dependent variable
- countries
- Germany
closeness to this project, 3 of 5
Gestefeld, Martin; Lorenz, Jan; Henschel, Nils Tobias; Boehnke, Klaus · 2022 · SN Social Sciences 2: 110
abstract In recent years, political discourse and election results appear to be more polarized in western countries but is this associated with increasing attitude polarization of their general public? To answer this question, many different polarization measures have been proposed in the literature but no systematic empirical comparison exists. In an exploratory analysis of 4155 attitude distributions on 11-point scales from the European Social Survey, we find that most polarization measures for single attitude distributions correlate strongly with the average attitude discrepancy between randomly selected pairs. We propose this as a catch-all measure for polarization because it can be decomposed into components related to different groups. By analyzing attitude distributions of the left–right political self-placements and several other topics, we find that distributions are typically not unimodal or bimodal, but show more so a structure with up to five modes. We exploit this structure by fitting a model with five latent groups of moderates, extremists, and centrists. Finally, we use the decomposition of polarization with respect to these groups to analyze polarization and its different aspects across topics, countries, and time establishing an overview and new perspectives on single attitude polarization in Europe.
our note Most single-distribution polarization measures correlate strongly with each other; distributions are usually multimodal rather than bimodal
- data
- 4,155 ESS attitude distributions on 11-point scales
- outcome
- Attitude distributions including left-right self-placement
- polarization measured as
- Compares polarization measures including van der Eijk's; proposes mean pairwise attitude discrepancy, decomposable by group
- countries
- European countries in the ESS
closeness to this project, 3 of 5
Rapp, Carolin · 2016 · Social Science Research 58: 34-45
abstract The publisher deposits none.
our note All three polarization measures are associated with lower social trust; the outcome is social trust rather than institutional trust
- data
- Cross-national survey data
- outcome
- Generalized social trust
- polarization measured as
- Three measures of opinion polarization: dispersion, bimodality, issue constraint
- countries
- 39 countries
closeness to this project, 3 of 5
van der Eijk, Cees · 2001 · Quality and Quantity 35(3): 325-341
abstract The publisher deposits none.
our note Defines agreement A, which handles skewed ordered scales better than the standard deviation
- data
- Methodological
- outcome
- Agreement A on ordered scales, rescalable to a polarization index
- polarization measured as
- The measure itself
- countries
- Not applicable
closeness to this project, 3 of 5
Comparative and cross-national
Confidence in courts across countries, usually on the European Social Survey, the World Values Survey or Eurobarometer, with polarization or regime change as the predictor.
15 studies
Magalhaes, Pedro C.; Garoupa, Nuno · 2024 · Journal of European Public Policy 31(9): 2748-2774
abstract The publisher deposits none.
our note Court curbing lowers judicial trust, much more clearly among respondents ideologically distant from the government
- data
- Eurobarometer waves, difference-in-differences
- outcome
- Trust in the national legal system
- polarization measured as
- Ideological distance from the government, individual level; trust in parliament as covariate
- countries
- Turkey, Hungary, Poland against comparison countries
closeness to this project, 5 of 5
Hemrajani, Rahul · 2026 · Political Research Quarterly 79: 765-780
abstract Judicial legitimacy, often conceptualised as ‘diffuse support’, signifies the public’s enduring goodwill toward courts, even in the face of unpopular decisions. However, the use of ‘trust in courts’ as a measure of legitimacy remains contested. Several scholars have argued that trust measures approval of the court’s specific decisions rather than long-term fidelity to the court. This paper reexamines the role of trust in measuring judicial legitimacy, arguing that its exclusion may be unwarranted and even detrimental to our understanding of courts. Through examining previously analysed survey data as well as original data from an online survey, I show that trust is a valid indicator of legitimacy. I further demonstrate, using a survey experiment, that framing effects are limited and show that most common phrasings of questions about trust in the judiciary behave similarly, allowing them to be used in cross-national comparisons. These findings demonstrate that researchers can leverage commonly asked public survey questions about trust in courts to understand judicial legitimacy across the world.
our note Trust is a defensible legitimacy indicator and common wordings behave similarly, which supports pooling across surveys
- data
- Reanalysis of prior surveys plus original online survey and a wording experiment
- outcome
- Trust in courts as a legitimacy indicator
- polarization measured as
- Not applicable
- countries
- Cross-national plus one original sample
closeness to this project, 4 of 5
Aydin-Cakir, Aylin · 2024 · Journal of European Public Policy 31(5): 1179-1205
abstract The publisher deposits none.
our note Informal curbing in Poland cut public confidence by roughly 15 per cent; no significant decline found for Hungary
- data
- Eurobarometer 2000-2019, synthetic control
- outcome
- Public confidence in the judiciary; de facto judicial independence
- polarization measured as
- Not polarization; formal vs informal court curbing
- countries
- Hungary, Poland
closeness to this project, 4 of 5
Hemrajani, Rahul · 2022 · APSA Preprints (preprint; a 2023 University of South Carolina dissertation covers the same index)
abstract The publisher deposits none.
our note Constitutional guarantees do not predict perceived legitimacy; democracy level, GDP and de facto independence do
- data
- Cross-national surveys, expert data and government statistics combined into a judicial legitimacy index
- outcome
- Perceived legitimacy of court systems, country-year
- polarization measured as
- Not polarization; constitutional design, democracy level, GDP, de facto independence
- countries
- Over 120 countries, 1990-2020
closeness to this project, 4 of 5
Magalhaes, Pedro C.; Garoupa, Nuno · 2020 · Social Science Quarterly 101(5): 1743-1760
abstract Objective Determining the existence of a relationship between judicial performance and citizens’ trust in the legal system. Method Cross‐classified multilevel models, using data from more than 20 European countries, 80 surveys, and 100,000 respondents, over a decade. Results The longer the time that lower courts take, on average, to dispose of pending cases, the lower is the public's trust in their legal system. Conclusion Judicial performance, operationalized as the ability of courts to avoid delays in the delivery of justice, is a significant correlate of citizens’ evaluations of their country's legal system.
our note Cross-classified multilevel models linking judicial performance to trust in the legal system
- data
- ESS cumulative file rounds 1-8; over 80 surveys, about 100,000 respondents
- outcome
- Trust in the legal system (ESS trstlgl)
- polarization measured as
- Not polarization; judicial performance indicators at country level
- countries
- Over 20 European countries
closeness to this project, 4 of 5
Paula da Cruz, Tatiana · 2026 · Journal of Politics in Latin America 18(2): 261-279
abstract Under which conditions do people tend to mistrust Courts, and what is the association between mistrust in Courts and perception of democracy? I argue that exposure to populist leaders and their antiestablishment disruptive rhetoric increases mistrust and its association with dissatisfaction with democracy. However, during times of crisis, courts can fortify democratic principles, thereby weakening this association. This argument is supported by data from a nationwide survey in Brazil during critical years (2018–2020) and the Latinobarómetro survey (2000–2020). Findings show that trust in courts, particularly the Federal Supreme Court (STF), was lowest during Bolsonaro's election and his first year in office, with a strong association between court mistrust and dissatisfaction with democracy. In 2020, when the STF defended federalism and equality against presidential overreach, trust in courts rose significantly, and the connection with democratic dissatisfaction weakened. This study adds to the literature on democratic erosion under populist regimes and highlights the STF's role in protecting Brazilian democracy.
our note Trust in the STF was lowest around Bolsonaro's election and first year and rose in 2020
- data
- Brazilian national surveys 2018-2020 plus Latinobarometro
- outcome
- Trust in the Supreme Federal Tribunal
- polarization measured as
- Not a dispersion measure; satisfaction with democracy and populist attitudes
- countries
- Brazil
closeness to this project, 3 of 5
De Micheli, David; Taylor, Whitney K. · 2024 · Government and Opposition 59(1): 146-167
abstract Despite the integral role of the judiciary to democracy, and the importance of judicial trust for judicial system performance, we know relatively little about the bases of public trust in this institution. How does institutional quality affect judicial trust? We explore this question in the context of Latin America, using a multilevel data set comprising survey data spanning 2001 to 2016 and country-level institutional and economic factors. We find that the effects of institutional quality on judicial trust are highly circumscribed. Factors like rule of law and corruption impact the judicial trust of only the best-educated survey respondents. Among the broader public, however, judicial trust is shaped more strongly by individuals' subjective economic and regime evaluations, as well as one's personal experiences with the judiciary.
our note Institutional quality matters mainly for the best educated; for most respondents subjective economic and regime evaluations and personal experience dominate
- data
- Multilevel survey data 2001-2016 with country indicators
- outcome
- Trust in the judiciary
- polarization measured as
- Not polarization; rule of law, corruption, economic and regime evaluations
- countries
- Latin America
closeness to this project, 3 of 5
Garoupa, Nuno; Magalhaes, Pedro C. · 2021 · West European Politics 44(3): 690-713
abstract The publisher deposits none.
our note De facto independence and accountability relate to trust, moderated by education and media exposure
- data
- European survey data with country indicators
- outcome
- Trust in the legal system
- polarization measured as
- Not polarization; education and media exposure moderate
- countries
- European countries
closeness to this project, 3 of 5
Navarrete, Rosa M.; Castillo-Ortiz, Pablo · 2020 · Comparative European Politics 18: 128-150
abstract The publisher deposits none.
our note Constitutional courts are associated with worse perceptions of independence and fairness, with the association weaker in older democracies
- data
- European Social Survey with institutional country data
- outcome
- Perceived judicial independence and fairness
- polarization measured as
- Not polarization; presence and age of constitutional courts
- countries
- European countries
closeness to this project, 3 of 5
Porat, Iddo; Cohen-Eliya, Moshe · 2026 · Cambridge University Press
abstract This book offers the first comprehensive comparative study of how political polarization reshapes the role and functioning of supreme and constitutional courts. Drawing on case studies from the United States, the United Kingdom, Brazil, India, Israel, Germany, Spain, and other jurisdictions, it examines how courts are transformed when deep political and social divisions meet powerful judicial institutions. The book identifies the factors that drive courts toward partisanship, the mechanisms through which polarization alters judicial nominations, decision-making and public trust, and the broader implications for the rule of law and democratic stability. It also analyzes reform proposals aimed at reducing the political stakes surrounding courts or balancing their internal composition. Combining theoretical analysis with rich comparative materials, the book will be of interest to scholars, students, and readers seeking to understand the challenges that polarized democracies face in maintaining legitimate, independent, and effective courts.
our note Argue previously nonpartisan institutions including courts drift toward partisanship under polarization
- data
- Doctrinal and comparative case analysis
- outcome
- Court behaviour and institutional position
- polarization measured as
- Conceptual (affective and ideological polarization)
- countries
- United States, Israel, several European cases
closeness to this project, 2 of 5
Patkos, Veronika; Plesz, Bendeguz · 2025 · West European Politics (online first)
abstract The publisher deposits none.
our note Polarization is associated with weaker accountability; courts are not the outcome
- data
- ESS, World Bank and V-Dem, 202 country-year observations over about twenty years
- outcome
- Macro-level democratic accountability
- polarization measured as
- Ideological and affective polarization at country level
- countries
- 28 European democracies
closeness to this project, 2 of 5
Sternberg, Sebastian; Brouard, Sylvain; Honnige, Christoph · 2022 · European Journal of Political Research 61(4): 973-996
abstract Can constitutional court decisions shape public opinion on a governmental policy? Previous studies have focused on the US Supreme Court, which enjoys a high degree of public support as the major resource of power for courts. In this study, we examine the extent to which courts can influence public opinion regarding a government bill at European courts. First, we argue that the public support for courts also allows them to move public opinion on policies into the direction of their decisions. This works in both directions: they can confer legitimacy to a policy that they support, but they can also de‐legitimize a policy that they oppose. Second, we argue that this mechanism strongly depends on the amount of support that a court receives. It only has an effect for courts that possess a higher institutional legitimacy and among the group of citizens trusting a court. We test our arguments by combining a most different systems design for France and Germany with a survey priming experiment on a school security bill. France and Germany are selected for a most different systems design as they exhibit different institutional designs as well as different levels of support for the court at the aggregate level. The survey experiment is implemented within large national election surveys, the German Internet Panel and the French National Election Study. Both experiments contain more than 2,600 respondents each. Our survey experiment primes for decision outcomes and different institutions to understand whether there are differences between an institution supporting and opposing a policy and between a court and alternative institutions. Our findings confirm that with higher public support, courts can move the opinion of citizens to both legitimize and de‐legitimize a policy. This effect can be found at the aggregate level for a court enjoying higher public support, but also at the individual level for respondents with higher trust in the court. Interestingly, courts can even move the opinion of citizens with strong prior attitudes in the opposite direction, if these citizens highly trust the court. These findings have implications beyond the study itself. First, they confirm that the legitimacy‐conferring effect can also be observed for European courts, not only for the US Supreme Court. Second, they show that the relevance of a mechanism identified for a single case, like the US Supreme Court, might only hold for specific conditions. As public support for courts strongly varies across countries in Europe, we also expect the impact of any mechanism relying on public support to strongly vary, as we can observe in our own analysis.
our note Constitutional court rulings confer some legitimacy on contested policies, with limits
- data
- Comparative survey experiment
- outcome
- Acceptance of policy after a court ruling
- polarization measured as
- Not polarization; prior policy agreement
- countries
- Several European countries
closeness to this project, 2 of 5
Driscoll, Amanda; Nelson, Michael J. · 2018 · Revista SAAP 12(2): 359-377
abstract The publisher deposits none.
our note Argue the assumption that Latin American courts lack public legitimacy is mistaken, and separate confidence from legitimacy
- data
- Regional surveys plus original legitimacy items
- outcome
- Diffuse support for high courts
- polarization measured as
- Not polarization
- countries
- Latin America and the United States
closeness to this project, 2 of 5
Salzman, Ryan; Ramsey, Adam · 2013 · Latin American Politics and Society 55(1): 73-95
abstract Although there is a substantial literature examining public confidence in the judiciary in developed nations, scholars have paid scant attention to analyzing judicial confidence in developing countries. Building on extant work regarding developed nations and introducing original hypotheses in the context of developing nations, this research explains influences on public confidence in Latin American judiciaries by developing a theory that focuses on the potential influences of institutional quality, experiences, and individual attitudes. The hypotheses are empirically tested with the rich individual-level data compiled by the Latin American Public Opinion Project 2006 survey. The results indicate that a variety of factors influence public confidence in Latin American courts; the role of context explains points of consistency and divergence with research on developed nations.
our note Individual evaluations and experience predict confidence in courts more than institutional design
- data
- AmericasBarometer survey data
- outcome
- Confidence in courts
- polarization measured as
- Not polarization
- countries
- Latin America
closeness to this project, 2 of 5
Rios-Figueroa, Julio; Staton, Jeffrey K. · 2014 · Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 30(1): 104-137
abstract The publisher deposits none.
our note De facto measures hold up better than de jure ones; correlated measurement error matters
- data
- 13 cross-national indicators
- outcome
- Judicial independence (not public opinion)
- polarization measured as
- Not applicable
- countries
- Global
closeness to this project, 1 of 5
Winners, losers and institutional trust
Whether supporters of the governing party trust institutions more than supporters of the opposition. The nearest established design to this project's government-against-opposition comparison.
6 studies
Hadaszi, Szabolcs · 2025 · Acta Politologica 17(2): 16-35
abstract If political trust is foundational to democracy, why do some countries remain stable while others experience democratic erosion, despite similar levels of trust? To address this question, this article shifts focus from country-level averages to the partisan polarization of trust, arguing that its distribution between government supporters and opposition voters offers a more accurate reflection of democratic quality. Using data from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project and the European Social Survey, the article examines the Visegrad countries – Czechia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. Findings show that while there is no clear relationship between country-level averages of trust and democratic quality, higher polarization of trust is clearly associated with lower democratic quality, with polarization preceding democratic decline rather than resulting from it. A critical threshold is also identified – once the trust gap surpasses a certain point, democratic quality tends to erode rapidly. Although the article’s exploratory design calls for a cautious interpretation of the findings, they show the relevance of partisan trust dynamics and provide new perspectives for future research on political trust.
our note Country averages of trust do not track democratic quality; the government-opposition trust gap does, and appears to precede decline
- data
- European Social Survey linked to V-Dem
- outcome
- Polarization of political trust between government supporters and opposition voters (specific ESS items not confirmed)
- polarization measured as
- Gap in trust between government supporters and opposition voters, country-year
- countries
- Czechia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia
closeness to this project, 5 of 5
Bohringer, Eileen; Boucher, Charlotte · 2024 · Electoral Studies 87: 102714
abstract The publisher deposits none.
our note A winner-loser confidence gap exists for the judiciary, smaller than for government and parliament; the gap is larger among supporters of populist parties
- data
- European Values Study 2017 wave
- outcome
- Confidence in the judicial system, with government and parliament as comparison institutions in the same file
- polarization measured as
- Winner/loser status by whether the respondent's party is in government; party family (populist vs mainstream)
- countries
- About 34 European countries, one wave
closeness to this project, 5 of 5
Gandur, Martin · 2025 · British Journal of Political Science 55: e126
abstract How do citizens evaluate the judiciary in the wake of politically salient rulings? I argue that judicial checks on the government shape citizens’ attitudes about judicial institutions at large, but these effects are driven by instrumental considerations, namely partisanship. In particular, my account suggests that judicial checks – as specific instances of interbranch conflict – provide citizens with instrumental information that shapes their beliefs about the broader judiciary. Thus, I hypothesize that court rulings limiting the government’s power will undermine support for the judiciary among individuals aligned with the incumbent, but increase support among opposition sympathizers. I test these expectations by exploiting the timing of two judicial decisions in Argentina (enacted by a lower court and the Supreme Court) that invalidated a highly salient judicial reform promoted by the government in 2013. Using data from a survey fielded before and after the court rulings, I show that the decisions significantly decreased government supporters’ trust in the judiciary, while opposition supporters increased their trust only following the Supreme Court ruling. Moreover, suggestive evidence provides support for the mechanism proposed by my account – that judicial checks expose citizens to information that is primarily instrumental. This article contributes to our knowledge of the determinants of public support for judicial institutions involved in interbranch conflicts.
our note Rulings against the government lowered trust among government supporters and raised it among opposition supporters
- data
- Argentine surveys fielded before and after two 2013 rulings
- outcome
- Trust in the judiciary
- polarization measured as
- Co-partisanship with the incumbent
- countries
- Argentina
closeness to this project, 4 of 5
Quaranta, Mario; Martini, Sergio · 2025 · European Societies 27(2): 235-262
abstract Recent comparative and single-case studies have investigated the link between the electoral performance of populist parties and the political attitudes and behaviors of populist voters. However, they have not addressed what happens to populist voters’ satisfaction with democracy and political trust when populist parties gain representation in parliament or join cabinets across countries and over time in Europe. This study argues that there are two possible expectations. According to a ‘winner-loser’ mechanism, populist voters’ political trust and satisfaction might increase, thus bridging the gap with mainstream voters. Conversely, according to a ‘spiral of distrust’ mechanism, populist parties fuel discontent and populist voters’ political trust and satisfaction might decrease. Analyses of nine rounds of the European Social Survey from 22 countries and LISS panel data from the Netherlands find that voters of populist parties have less satisfaction with democracy, and less trust in parliament and politicians than voters of mainstream parties. However, these differences narrow over time when populist parties gain seats in parliament and enter the cabinet. This article shows that voters for populist parties might be ‘losers in disguise’ and that the performance of the parties they support serves as a corrective mechanism for their political dissatisfaction and distrust.
our note Populist voters show larger winner-loser swings in satisfaction and trust
- data
- European cross-national survey data
- outcome
- Satisfaction with democracy and political trust
- polarization measured as
- Winner/loser status crossed with populist party support
- countries
- Europe
closeness to this project, 2 of 5
Anderson, Christopher J.; Blais, Andre; Bowler, Shaun; Donovan, Todd; Listhaug, Ola · 2005 · Oxford University Press
abstract Democratic elections are designed to create unequal outcomes—for some to win, others have to lose. This book examines the consequences of this inequality for the legitimacy of democratic political institutions and systems. Using survey data collected in old and new democracies around the globe, the authors argue that losing generates ambivalent attitudes towards political authorities. Because the efficacy and ultimately the survival of democratic regimes can be seriously threatened if the losers do not consent to their loss, the central themes of this book focus on losing—how losers respond to their loss and how institutions shape losing. While there tends to be a gap in support for the political system between winners and losers, it is not ubiquitous. The book paints a picture of losers’ consent that portrays losers as political actors whose experience and whose incentives to accept defeat are shaped both by who they are as individuals as well as the political environment in which loss is given meaning. Given that the winner-loser gap in legitimacy is a persistent feature of democratic politics, the findings presented in this book have important implications for our understanding of the functioning and stability of democracies since being able to accept losing is one of the central, if not the central, requirement of democracy. The book contributes to our understanding of political legitimacy, comparative political behaviour, the comparative study of elections and political institutions, as well as issues of democratic stability, design, and transition.
our note Establish the winner-loser gap as a persistent feature and tie its size to institutional design
- data
- Multiple cross-national surveys
- outcome
- Satisfaction with democracy and institutional trust
- polarization measured as
- Winner/loser status
- countries
- Many democracies
closeness to this project, 2 of 5
Anderson, Christopher J.; Guillory, Christine A. · 1997 · American Political Science Review 91(1): 66-81
abstract Do political institutions affect citizen satisfaction with democracy? If so, how? Using cross-sectional survey data for eleven European democracies together with data on the type of democracy in which individuals live, we demonstrate that the nature of representative democratic institutions (measured by Arend Lijphart's consensus-majority index of democracies) mediates the relationship between a person's status as part of the political minority or majority and his or her satisfaction with the way the system works. Specifically, we find that (1) the losers of democratic competition show lower levels of satisfaction than do those in the majority and (2) losers in systems that are more consensual display higher levels of satisfaction with the way democracy works than do losers in systems with majoritarian characteristics. Conversely, winners tend to be more satisfied with democracy the more a country's political institutions approximate pure majoritarian government.
our note The winner-loser gap is smaller under consensual than majoritarian institutions
- data
- Eurobarometer
- outcome
- Satisfaction with democracy
- polarization measured as
- Winner/loser status
- countries
- Western Europe
closeness to this project, 1 of 5
Polarization and the legitimacy of the United States Supreme Court
The American literature, including the long argument over whether the Court's diffuse support has become partisan.
16 studies
Davis, Nicholas T.; Hitt, Matthew P. · 2026 · American Journal of Political Science 70(1): 238-255
abstract This paper studies the contours of Supreme Court legitimacy. First, we construct a data set of surveys from 2012 to 2024 to show that diffuse support now diverges among partisans; we then analyze an original, six‐wave panel survey that reveals the stability of this partisan sorting. Second, we unpack the direct and indirect effects of partisanship on legitimacy: Democrats are more cynical about the Court, disapprove of its outputs, and view obedience to the law differently than Republicans, which contributes to the profound partisan gap in legitimacy. Finally, we reevaluate the relationship between specific and diffuse support by introducing a new measure of specific support, which shows that “fatalistic” views of the Supreme Court contribute to low levels of legitimacy. Today, Democrats’ pessimism toward the Court has eliminated decades of positivity and goodwill. This fatalistic sorting among large swaths of the public implies that the Court's authority now rests on weak and polarized foundations.
our note Diffuse support has sorted by party; they propose fatalism about future wins as the mechanism
- data
- Assembled surveys 2012 to 2024
- outcome
- Diffuse support
- polarization measured as
- Partisan sorting over time
- countries
- United States
closeness to this project, 3 of 5
Levendusky, Matthew; Patterson, Shawn; Margolis, Michele; Pasek, Josh; Winneg, Kenneth; Jamieson, Kathleen Hall · 2024 · Science Advances 10: eadk9590
abstract Have perceptions of the U.S. Supreme Court polarized, much like the rest of American politics? Because of the Court’s unique role, for many years, it remained one of the few institutions respected by both Democrats and Republicans alike. But the Court’s dramatic shift to the right in recent years—highlighted by its Dobbs decision in 2022—potentially upends that logic. Using both eight waves of panel data and 18 nationally representative surveys spanning two decades, we show that while there was little evidence of partisan polarization in earlier years, in 2022 and 2023, such patterns are clear in favorability, trust, legitimacy, and support for reform. Factors that used to protect the Court—like knowledge about it and support for key democratic values—no longer do so. The Court has also become more important to voters, and will likely remain a political flashpoint, with disquieting implications for the Court’s place in our polity.
our note Little partisan divergence before 2022, clear divergence in 2022 and 2023; prior insulating factors no longer insulate
- data
- 8 panel waves and 18 cross-sections over about two decades
- outcome
- Favourability, trust, legitimacy, support for reform
- polarization measured as
- Party identification gap over time
- countries
- United States
closeness to this project, 3 of 5
Armaly, Miles T.; Enders, Adam M. · 2022 · Political Research Quarterly 75(2): 409-424
abstract Support for the U.S. Supreme Court does not appear to be polarized on ideological or partisan lines. However, the form of polarization for which the mass political behavior field has amassed substantial support is affective in nature. We reconsider the hypothesis that polarization does not bear on Court support by examining the role of affective polarization. Using three sources of nationally representative survey data, we consistently find a negative relationship between affective polarization and both diffuse and specific support for the Court. Moreover, neither general nor Court-specific political sophistication mitigates the negative effect of affective polarization; rather, sophistication exacerbates affective polarization’s influence on support. Finally, panel data show that affective polarization precedes negative evaluations of the judiciary, though there is no support for the converse relationship. Evaluations of the Court are not free from the forces of polarization but are influenced by diverging extra-judicial emotional orientations toward in- and out-groups.
our note Affective polarization is negatively associated with both diffuse and specific support; sophistication worsens rather than dampens it
- data
- Three US nationally representative surveys
- outcome
- Diffuse and specific support
- polarization measured as
- Affective polarization, individual level (party thermometer distance)
- countries
- United States
closeness to this project, 3 of 5
Armaly, Miles T.; Krewson, Christopher N.; Lane, Elizabeth A. · 2026 · Political Research Quarterly (online first)
abstract Supreme Court nominations culminate in nearly 24-7, multi-day coverage of the nominee and elected officials discussing the nominee’s views, qualifications, and the Supreme Court. Scholars show that these events shape public attitudes. In this paper, we argue that nominee evaluations, which are largely a function of partisanship, have a significant and enduring effect on public approval of the Court. As a result, we contend that the effect of partisanship on Court approval is mediated through nominee support. To test this, we utilize nationally representative CES data from the last five nominations that included hearings, including over-time data for three of the nominations. We analyze these data using causal mediation analysis shortly after the nominations, and again one to four years later. Our results confirm our theoretical expectations: much of the effect of partisanship on Court approval is transmitted through the support of recent nominees, and the nominee effects often last for years.
our note Nomination fights have durable partisan effects on approval
- data
- US surveys
- outcome
- Supreme Court approval
- polarization measured as
- Partisanship
- countries
- United States
closeness to this project, 2 of 5
Gibson, James L. · 2024 · American Journal of Political Science 68(3): 1041-1056
abstract Extant research has established that displeasure with a Supreme Court ruling typically has negligible consequences for institutional support, largely because, as legitimacy theory's positivity bias explains, judicial decisions are invariably delivered with the accoutrements of legitimizing symbols. The Court's ruling in Dobbs , abrogating a federal constitutional right to abortion services, may challenge legitimacy theory because displeasure with the ruling seems so widespread and intense. This research aims to determine whether the ruling lessened the Court's legitimacy. The general conclusion is that Dobbs produced a sizeable dent in institutional support, perhaps to an unprecedented degree, in part because abortion attitudes for many are infused with moral content and in part owing to the Court's substantial tilt to the right since 2020. Indeed, the Court's legitimacy may be at greater risk today than at any time since Franklin D. Roosevelt's 1930s attack on the institution.
our note Dobbs assessments are strongly associated with diffuse support, which the author treats as a departure from the earlier positivity bias
- data
- US national survey after Dobbs
- outcome
- Diffuse support
- polarization measured as
- Ruling assessment and partisanship
- countries
- United States
closeness to this project, 2 of 5
Davis, Nicholas T.; Hitt, Matthew P. · 2024 · Journal of Law and Courts 12(2): 392-412
abstract Despite the Supreme Court’s lack of direct electoral accountability, voters may factor its outputs into their voting decisions because elected representatives can affect the Court’s powers and composition. In this paper, we uncover an ironic predicament that faces candidates running on reforming this institution. Citizens who possess higher levels of diffuse support for the Court are more likely to rank it as an important factor in their voting logic. But because this diffuse support has sorted along partisan lines, candidate messaging about reform may not motivate partisans who have lost support for the Court because they view it as less important than other pressing issues. Thus, although Democrats are sympathetic to reform, Democratic candidates may have weak incentives to promote reform given low levels of diffuse support among their constituents. This dynamic mitigates against the possibility of a public or congressional backlash against the Court, preserving the status quo.
our note Link diffuse support to electoral behaviour along partisan lines
- data
- US surveys
- outcome
- Diffuse support and vote relevance
- polarization measured as
- Partisanship
- countries
- United States
closeness to this project, 2 of 5
Nelson, Michael J.; Tucker, Patrick D. · 2021 · The Journal of Politics 83(2): 767-771
abstract The publisher deposits none.
our note Individual-level legitimacy is fairly stable over the period studied
- data
- US panel survey
- outcome
- Diffuse support
- polarization measured as
- Partisanship
- countries
- United States
closeness to this project, 2 of 5
Rogowski, Jon C.; Stone, Andrew R. · 2021 · British Journal of Political Science 51(3): 1251-1269
abstract Contemporary US Supreme Court nominations are unavoidably and inevitably political. Although observers worry that political contestation over nominations undermines support for qualified nominees and threatens the Court's legitimacy, there is little empirical evidence to support these claims. The authors argue that political contestation over judicial nominations provides cues that shape the public's impressions about nominees and the Court and polarizes public opinion across partisan lines. Data from a conjoint experiment administered in the first days of the Trump presidency support this argument. Political rhetoric attributed to President Trump and Senate Democrats substantially polarized partisans’ views of nominees and evaluations of the Court's legitimacy, with Republicans (Democrats) expressing significantly more (less) favorable attitudes. Additional analyses suggest that contestation generates divergent partisan responses by affecting views about the nominee's impartiality. These findings challenge existing perspectives that depict attitudes toward the judiciary as resistant to partisan considerations and have important implications for the Court's legitimacy in a polarized era.
our note Contested nominations widen partisan gaps in Court evaluations
- data
- US surveys and experiments around nominations
- outcome
- Court evaluations and legitimacy
- polarization measured as
- Partisan divergence in response to nomination contestation
- countries
- United States
closeness to this project, 2 of 5
Bartels, Brandon L.; Johnston, Christopher D. · 2020 · Cambridge University Press
abstract The publisher deposits none.
our note Argue public support for judicial independence is contingent on policy agreement
- data
- US surveys and experiments
- outcome
- Support for curbing the Court, legitimacy
- polarization measured as
- Policy disagreement and partisanship
- countries
- United States
closeness to this project, 2 of 5
Gibson, James L.; Nelson, Michael J. · 2015 · American Journal of Political Science 59(1): 162-174
abstract Bartels and Johnston have recently presented evidence suggesting that the legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court is grounded in the ideological preferences and perceptions of the American people. In addition, they offer experimental data purporting to show that dissatisfaction with a single Court decision substantially diminishes the institution's legitimacy. These findings strongly break with earlier research on the Court's institutional support, as the authors recognize. The theoretical implications of their findings are profound. If the authors are correct that legitimacy is strongly dependent upon satisfying the policy preferences and ideological predilections of the American people, the essence of legitimacy is fundamentally transformed. Consequently, we reinvestigate the relationships among ideology, performance satisfaction, and Court legitimacy, unearthing empirical findings that diverge markedly from theirs. We conclude with some thoughts about how the Court's “countermajoritarian dilemma” can be reconceptualized and recalculated, once more drawing conclusions sharply at odds with those of Bartels and Johnston.
our note Reply to Bartels and Johnston; report that the ideology-legitimacy link is weaker than claimed
- data
- US national surveys
- outcome
- Diffuse support for the US Supreme Court
- polarization measured as
- Ideological disagreement, individual level
- countries
- United States
closeness to this project, 2 of 5
Gibson, James L.; Nelson, Michael J. · 2014 · Annual Review of Law and Social Science 10: 201-219
abstract Research on the legitimacy of the US Supreme Court has blossomed of late, with scholars investigating many different hypotheses derived from legitimacy theory. As the theory has been pushed, a number of new controversies have emerged. Here, we identify four such debates: (a) whether the Court's legitimacy rests on satisfaction with its performance, (b) whether support for the Supreme Court reflects the polarization of politics in the contemporary United States, (c) whether the Court's legitimacy requires belief in the “myth of legality”, and (d) whether judicial decisions can change public opinion. Our analysis of these issues generally concludes that the Supreme Court's legitimacy is reasonably secure, in part because individual rulings have little impact on support for the institution, in part because the Court has access to powerful and influential symbols of judicial authority, and in part because the current Supreme Court issues roughly equal numbers of conservative and liberal decisions.
our note Review framing four disputes, one of which is whether Court support reflects contemporary polarization
- data
- Review of prior surveys
- outcome
- Diffuse support
- polarization measured as
- Partisanship and ideology as reviewed
- countries
- United States
closeness to this project, 2 of 5
Bartels, Brandon L.; Johnston, Christopher D. · 2013 · American Journal of Political Science 57(1): 184-199
abstract Conventional wisdom says that individuals’ ideological preferences do not influence Supreme Court legitimacy orientations. Most work is based on the assumption that the contemporary Court is objectively conservative in its policymaking, meaning that ideological disagreement should come from liberals and agreement from conservatives. Our nuanced look at the Court's policymaking suggests rational bases for perceiving the Court's contemporary policymaking as conservative, moderate, and even liberal. We argue that subjective ideological disagreement—incongruence between one's ideological preferences and one's perception of the Court's ideological tenor—must be accounted for when explaining legitimacy. Analysis of a national survey shows that subjective ideological disagreement exhibits a potent, deleterious impact on legitimacy. Ideology exhibits sensible connections to legitimacy depending on how people perceive the Court's ideological tenor. Results from a survey experiment support our posited mechanism. Our work has implications for the public's view of the Court as a “political” institution.
our note Report that legitimacy is conditioned on ideological disagreement with the Court, against the Gibson position that it is not
- data
- Original US national surveys
- outcome
- Diffuse support for the US Supreme Court
- polarization measured as
- Ideological disagreement with the Court, individual level
- countries
- United States
closeness to this project, 2 of 5
Nelson, Michael J.; Gibson, James L. · 2026 · Political Research Quarterly 79(1): 248-262
abstract Despite high-profile arguments about the negative consequences of judicial elections for judicial legitimacy, empirical evidence is ambiguous, at best. Drawing on more than 28,000 survey responses, representative at the state level, we find no evidence that elected courts are less legitimate than appointed courts. To further explore this finding, we draw upon a survey of Wisconsin, a state that has experienced a large amount of politicized judicial campaigning. We demonstrate that citizens expect this type of activity in their elections, even though they say they dislike it. Then, we present new evidence on the causal effects of campaign activity on attitudes toward courts in this state. We demonstrate that, though citizens may believe that courts selected through expensive and negative elections are less fair, there is no evidence that they find elected courts to be less legitimate or worthy of compliance.
our note No evidence that elected courts are less legitimate than appointed courts
- data
- Over 28,000 state-representative US responses plus a Wisconsin survey
- outcome
- Legitimacy of state courts
- polarization measured as
- Not a polarization design; selection method is the predictor
- countries
- United States (states)
closeness to this project, 1 of 5
Hasen, Richard L. · 2019 · Annual Review of Political Science 22: 261-276
abstract The increased polarization in the United States among the political branches and citizenry affects the selection, work, perception, and relative power of state and federal judges, including justices of the US Supreme Court. Polarization in the United States over the last few decades matters to the American judicial system in at least four ways. First, polarization affects judicial selection, whether the selection method is (sometimes partisan-based) elections or appointment by political actors. In times of greater polarization, governors and presidents who nominate judges, legislators who confirm judges, and voters who vote on judicial candidates are more apt to support or oppose judges on the basis of partisan affiliation or cues. Second, driven in part by selection mechanisms, polarization may be reflected in the decisions that judges make, especially on issues that divide people politically, such as abortion, guns, or affirmative action. The Supreme Court, for example, often divides along party and ideological lines in the most prominent and highly contested cases. Those ideological lines now overlap with party as we enter a period in which all the Court liberals have been appointed by Democratic presidents and all the Court conservatives have been appointed by Republican presidents. Third, increasingly polarized judicial decisions appear to be causing the public to view judges and judicial decision making (at least on the US Supreme Court) through a more partisan lens. Fourth, polarization may affect the separation of powers, by empowering courts against polarized legislative bodies sometimes paralyzed by gridlock. The review concludes by considering how increased polarization may interact with the judiciary and judicial branch going forward and by suggesting areas for future research.
our note Review of how polarization reaches courts, including public perceptions
- data
- Review
- outcome
- Judicial behaviour and public views
- polarization measured as
- Elite and mass polarization as reviewed
- countries
- United States mainly
closeness to this project, 1 of 5
Christenson, Dino P.; Glick, David M. · 2015 · American Journal of Political Science 59(2): 403-418
abstract The publisher deposits none.
our note A salient ruling shifted perceived Court ideology and, through that, legitimacy
- data
- US panel around NFIB v. Sebelius
- outcome
- Diffuse support
- polarization measured as
- Partisan perceptions of Court ideology
- countries
- United States
closeness to this project, 1 of 5
Benesh, Sara C. · 2006 · The Journal of Politics 68(3): 697-707
abstract The publisher deposits none.
our note Confidence in courts is shaped by procedural fairness perceptions and knowledge
- data
- US survey
- outcome
- Confidence in courts
- polarization measured as
- Not a polarization design
- countries
- United States
closeness to this project, 1 of 5
Judicial independence under democratic backsliding
Court curbing and public opinion in Poland, Hungary, Israel, Brazil, Mexico and the United States.
5 studies
Simunovic, Dora; Dorfman, Anna; Katzir, Maayan · 2024 · Communications Psychology 2: 59
abstract This work explored polarization over Israel’s Judicial Reform, introduced in January 2023. We find that the reform divided people into pro- and anti-reform camps, which differed in characteristics such as institutional trust, patriotism, and national identity. For example, the camps disagreed about trust in the government versus the judiciary. In line with motivated reasoning—biased reasoning processes used to reach desired conclusions—people’s pre-existing characteristics motivated polarized views of the reform as a threat to democracy (issue-based polarization) and negative emotions towards opponents (affective polarization). Further demonstrating a motivated process, pro-reform participants (the electorate majority), prioritized majority rule over other democratic features (e.g., minority rights) compared to anti-reform participants. Polarization differentially predicted downstream consequences (e.g., protest methods), indicating that the camps’ reactions were motivated by the extremity of their views and negative emotions. This work extends the understanding of potentially motivated polarization processes and their immediate downstream consequences.
our note The two camps differ in institutional trust, disagreeing about the judiciary against the government; most respondents sit at the extremes
- data
- Two survey rounds of the Israeli Jewish population, March and May 2023
- outcome
- Trust in the judiciary vs trust in government, issue and affective polarization
- polarization measured as
- Camp membership (pro/anti reform), affective polarization measures
- countries
- Israel
closeness to this project, 3 of 5
Cheruvu, Sivaram; Krehbiel, Jay N. · 2026 · European Journal of Political Research (online first)
abstract This article considers the interaction of the expansion of international law and the rising politicization of domestic institutions. As international legal processes frequently incorporate domestic institutions, how citizens react to the development of international law may become influenced by their perceptions of those institutions. We argue that involving politicized domestic institutions in the international legal decision-making process affects support for rulings through individuals’ perceptions of the domestic judiciary vis-a-vis an international court. Contra our preregistered expectations, a survey experiment fielded in Hungary shows that opposition partisans withdraw support for a European Union law decision when it is issued by a Hungarian court rather than directly by the European Court of Justice, while the involvement of a national court does not increase support for European Union law among government supporters. Further exploratory analyses of government supporters suggest that court decisions are broadly unlikely to move these individuals’ attitudes toward international law.
our note A captured domestic court can reduce confidence in international law
- data
- Nationally representative Hungarian survey, March 2022
- outcome
- Confidence in domestic and international courts
- polarization measured as
- Not a dispersion measure; partisanship and court source
- countries
- Hungary
closeness to this project, 2 of 5
Solska, Magdalena · 2025 · Zeitschrift fur Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft 19: 201-216
abstract Most scholarly arguments related to the judicial reform in Poland highlight intentional demolition of democratic standards by the PiS-led government and the subordination of the judiciary to the executive. This article puts forward a theoretical argument that factors polarizing strategy of incumbents and opposition into the analysis of the rule of law crisis. Whereas PiS-led government is responsible for devastation of the judiciary undermining the rule of law in the country, the new government’s continued polarizing strategy is counterproductive to the strengthening of the rule of law. This is linked to the very nature of rule of law, which implies an unwritten compromise between legal and political elite regarding their role in law creation in the constitutional praxis.
our note Argues that in a polarized setting judicial reform without elite consensus produces counter-polarization and contested legality
- data
- Case study of Polish judicial reform politics
- outcome
- Legality contests and elite conflict
- polarization measured as
- Conceptual polarization
- countries
- Poland
closeness to this project, 2 of 5
Driscoll, Amanda; Nelson, Michael J. · 2023 · The Journal of Politics 85(2): 609-624
abstract The publisher deposits none.
our note Electoral costs of court curbing are small
- data
- US survey experiments
- outcome
- Willingness to punish court curbing
- polarization measured as
- Partisanship
- countries
- United States
closeness to this project, 2 of 5
Driscoll, Amanda; Nelson, Michael J. · 2015 · Journal of Law and Courts 3(1): 115-148
abstract In 2011, Bolivia became the first modern country to directly elect national judges. Reformers heralded the adoption of judicial elections as a “democratization of justice,” by which institutional independence would be assured, public confidence in the judiciary might be expanded, and various maladies of the judicial system would find resolution. We evaluate the elections in light of these objectives. We show candidates were advantaged when voters shared their partisan and demographic traits, resulting in unprecedented diversity on the national courts. Also, public confidence in the judiciary increased among government supporters but declined overall. We offer preliminary reflections for would-be reformers.
our note Judicial elections did not deliver the intended democratization of justice
- data
- Bolivian election returns and survey data
- outcome
- Participation and support for elected judges
- polarization measured as
- Not a polarization design
- countries
- Bolivia
closeness to this project, 1 of 5
Legal consciousness
Ewick and Silbey's registers, and the nearest cross-national survey instruments.
3 studies
Jackson, Jonathan; Bradford, Ben; Hough, Mike; Kuha, Jouni; Stares, Sally; Widdop, Sally; Fitzgerald, Rory; Yordanova, Maria; Galev, Todor · 2011 · European Journal of Criminology 8(4): 267-285
abstract A social indicators approach to trust in justice recognizes that the police and criminal courts need public support and institutional legitimacy if they are to operate effectively and fairly. In order to generate public cooperation and compliance, these institutions must demonstrate to citizens that they are trustworthy and that they possess the authority to govern. In this paper we first outline the conceptual roadmap for a current comparative analysis of trust in justice. We then describe the methodological development process of a 45-item module in Round 5 of the European Social Survey, which fields the core survey indicators. After presenting the findings from a quantitative pilot of the indicators, we consider the policy implications of a procedural justice model of criminal justice.
our note Build comparable European indicators of trust in justice, the nearest survey instrument to a legal-consciousness measure
- data
- ESS Round 5 trust in justice module
- outcome
- Trust in police and courts, legitimacy, procedural fairness
- polarization measured as
- Not a polarization design
- countries
- About 20 European countries
closeness to this project, 2 of 5
Chua, Lynette J.; Engel, David M. · 2019 · Annual Review of Law and Social Science 15: 335-353
abstract Legal consciousness is a vibrant research field attracting growing numbers of scholars worldwide. Yet differing assumptions about aims and methods have generated vigorous debate, typically resulting from a failure to recognize that three different clusters of scholars—identified here as the Identity, Hegemony, and Mobilization schools—are pursuing different goals and deploying the concept of legal consciousness in different ways. Scholarship associated with these three schools demonstrates that legal consciousness is actually a flexible paradigm with multiple applications rather than a monolithic approach. Furthermore, a new generation of scholars has energized the field in recent years, focusing on marginalized peoples and non-Western settings. Through their findings, and as a result of broader trends across the social sciences, relational legal consciousness has taken on greater importance. Legal consciousness research should be imagined on a continuum ranging from individualistic conceptualizations of thought and action to interactive, co-constitutive approaches.
our note Sort the field into identity, hegemony and mobilization strands; the reviewed work is overwhelmingly qualitative
- data
- Review of the field
- outcome
- Legal consciousness research designs
- polarization measured as
- Not applicable
- countries
- Global
closeness to this project, 1 of 5
Ewick, Patricia; Silbey, Susan S. · 1998 · University of Chicago Press
abstract The publisher deposits none.
our note Set out before the law, with the law, against the law as cultural schemas of legality
- data
- Over 400 interviews in New Jersey
- outcome
- Narratives of legality
- polarization measured as
- Not applicable
- countries
- United States
closeness to this project, 1 of 5